this question's answer at the intersection of history and theology; focusing in particular on a theological analysis of the American Catholic hierarchy's response to slavery. I frame this pursuit in the architecture of recent papal and theological reflection on memory and repentance. Reflecting on the history within this framework can help draw out the religious and moral implications of the American episcopal teachings on slavery-with a special emphasis on the relationship between inadequate or false church teaching and church practice.
Before proceeding to ask this question, I must distinguish the pursuit of its answer from erroneous deductions about the implications of possible responses. If, as I shall argue in this article, John Paul II believes erroneous teaching is suitable for apology and repentance, that should not be understood to undermine church teaching in general, nor to commit us to assuming crass political machinations for any particular erroneous teaching. Actually, a study like this will show the opposite; that despite good faith, teaching can be erroneous. Likewise, it is false to equate errors in some teachings with the possibility, probability, or existence of error in all teaching. Doctrine develops, and one responsibility of theologians is to scrutinize church teaching and make the necessary distinctions between development and departure. The notion of doctrinal development entails a notion of doctrinal continuity. And, finally, it is wrong to identify the teaching authorities of the Church, or any single person or group of persons, with the Church. That some Church teaching may have been erroneous, or that some Catholics (individuals, popes, even religious orders) may have bought or held slaves, does not mean the Church erred, or the Church held slaves. 2 Whatever rhetorical advantages arise from such assertions as "the Church held slaves," do so at the expense of common sense and ecclesiological precision.
PAST WRONG AND REPENTANCE
In his 1994 apostolic letter, Tertio millennio adveniente, John Paul II says the Church must "become more fully conscious of the sinfulness of her children, recalling all those times in history when they departed from the spirit of Christ and his Gospel and, instead of offering to the world the witness of a life inspired by the values of faith, indulged in ways of thinking and acting which were truly forms of counter-witness and scandal." 3 The subject of past wrong and repentance informs much current popular and academic discussion. Some argue that we are in the "Age of Apology." 4 Recently, the historian Garry Wills challenged the Catholic Church's "deep structures of deceit" and, in his words, its inability to come clean and admit past error. 5 Wills believes the Church constitutionally incapable of truth, creating in Catholics "a habit of skepticism or secret infidelity as regards all dogmatic truth." Most Catholics, or most Catholics Wills knows, do not believe a word the pope says. If Wills's dour remarks are within a sniff of the truth, then the pope's encouragement to repentance comes at a good time indeed.
Wills represents one side of a recent two-sided discussion within Catholicism that centers on appropriate ways to read history in the Church. On the one hand, there are those such as Wills who condemn those in the past who failed to see moral issues as clearly as they do. On the other, there are those unwilling to make any moral judgments about past actions and beliefs. Unfortunately, the parties rarely engage each other and often speak on different levels or about different subjects. The pope's recent pronouncements are compelling the parties to confront each other. His statements reject both alternatives, and encourage the sympathetic and unsentimental engagement of history. John Paul II invites us to judge our predecessors, but in humility. The way out of the apparent impasse that separates the parties involves a deeper appreciation of the complexities and ambiguities of history that render all quick judgments suspect. Our connection with the past makes judgment possible and necessary if we are to appropriate our past as a living part of our heritage.
The pope's challenge to Christians requires that we ascertain where the Church departed from Christ's spirit, and where it did not. I question whether the U.S. Catholic bishops departed from the spirit of Christ and his gospel by not condemning slavery in America. 6 Because it seems to have been largely ignored in responses to the challenge of Tertio millennio adveniente, I am most interested in attending to the relationship of church teaching to church action: is it possible that erroneous, unclear, or incomplete teaching led and leads to Christian behavior worthy of regret or even apology?
AN OVERVIEW
My article proceeds in three parts. First, I explore recent church documents that support concluding that teaching errors have contributed to climates in which children of the Church did what was objectively wrong. Secondly, I turn to the specific case of slavery in the United States. I analyze the American bishops' reception of Gregory XVI's apostolic letter In supremo apostolatus (1839). I then focus primarily on Bishop John England of South Carolina. Bishop England defended Catholicism against accusations that it opposed every form of slavery. Recently, there has been much criticism of the bishops' (in)action. This criticism provides the opportunity to exhibit the difficulty, of understanding and evaluating past errors. Thirdly, I make some final comments and raise questions.
The promulgation of Tertio millennio adveniente on November 10, 1994 was a critical event in John Paul II's papacy. Joseph Komonchak calls it one of the "most remarkable documents of the pontificate."
8 The text calls on the Church to prepare for the new millennium.
9 This "can only be expressed in a renewed commitment to apply, as faithfully as possible, the teachings of Vatican II to the life of every individual and of the whole Church" (no. 20). The document describes the examination of conscience that the Church had to make at the end of the millennium. This preparatory step may lead to greater unity among Christians. The pope hoped that Critique of United States Catholic History," Pro Ecclesia 5 (1996) 440-69, at 441. Baxter's sights are set on "Americanist" historians, among whom he counts John Tracy Ellis. According to Baxter, evidence of Ellis's Americanism comes in the historian's inability to see either that slavery violates the law of Christ, or if Ellis does see it, to "write it into his account, with the judgment that the bishops and laity who supported the institution of slavery were in error." 7 I use "doctrine" throughout to refer to church teaching broadly considered and not limited either to dogma or to papal pronouncements. Church teaching can thus be understood as dominant theological opinion, or the teaching of individual or collected bishops speaking on behalf of the Church. On these and similar points, see Francis Sullivan, Magisterium: Teaching Authority in the Catholic Church (New York: Paulist, 1983), especially chap. 7.
8 Joseph A. Komonchak, "Preparing for the New Millennium," Logos 1:2 (1997) 34-55, at 34. 9 John Paul II refers to preparation for the year 2000 as the "hermeneutical key" of his pontificate (no. 23). See also Komonchak, "Preparing for the New Millennium" 34.
"the Jubilee will be a promising opportunity for fruitful cooperation in the many areas which unite [Christians]" (no. 16).
In Tertio millennio adveniente (no. 23) John Paul II emphasizes the task of spiritual preparation. 10 The Jubilee is a special time for the Church, distinct from other times and different from other anniversaries. The Jubilee is "a 'year of the Lord's favor,' a year of the remission of sins and of the punishments due to them, a year of reconciliation between disputing parties, a year of manifold conversion and of sacramental and extrasacramental penance" (no. 14). The Jubilee of the year 2000, which the Church celebrated as a Great Jubilee, is "aimed at an increased sensitivity to all that the Spirit is saying to the Church and to the Churches. . . . The purpose is to emphasize what the Spirit is suggesting to the different communities, from the smallest ones, such as the family, to the largest ones, such as nations and international organizations . . ." (no. 23). The entire community of Christians was called upon to undergo self-examination and penance: no one and no community is exempt. Thus, the pope: ". . . the Church should become more fully conscious of the sinfulness of her children, recalling all those times in history when they departed from the spirit of Christ and his Gospel and . . . indulged in ways of thinking and acting which were truly forms of counter-witness and scandal" (no. 33). The pope bases the joy of the Jubilee on this process of conversion from sin.
Confession, forgiveness, and reconciliation have been recurring themes of this present pontificate. Luigi Accattoli's When a Pope Asks Forgiveness: The Mea Culpa's of John Paul II collects 94 quotations in which John Paul II asks forgiveness or pardon for the Church. 11 In 1984 he issued the apostolic exhortation "Reconciliation and Penance" devoted to this theme and in which he announced his intention to make reconciliation the theme of the Jubilee.
12 His encyclical letter Ut unum sint (1995) asks forgiveness from other Christians for those sufferings brought on by Catholics. 13 Often, however, friends and foes misinterpret the pope's bold moves toward honest confession of Christian sinfulness. Those fashioning themselves supporters of the Church mute the challenge. Critics, like Wills, miss the boldness because of the prominence of their own agendas and timetables. One party criticizes the pope for acting at all; the other criticizes him for not acting swiftly or comprehensively enough. One way that the challenge is muted is through failing to attend to the relationship of mistaken 10 I follow Komonchak, "Preparing for the New Millennium" 36-37. 11 The pope means more than Dulles's interpretation allows. John Paul II refers to the "ways of thinking" for which the Church must repent (no. 33). Thus, where Dulles restricts the confessions to actions, the pope's reference to "ways of thinking and acting" opens wider possibilities for consideration. The phrase urges us to consider the distinction between "ways of thinking" and "ways of acting." Might the Pope be referring merely to some of the ways individual Christians thought about certain issues? Is there any basis for construing "ways of thinking" as pertaining to the teaching of the Church?
In the opening of the third section of Tertio millennio adveniente, John Paul II writes of the Second Vatican Council as a "providential event" (no. 18). At the council the Church showed how "the 'old' and the 'new' are always closely interwoven. The 'new' grows out of the 'old, ' 18 See also Dei Verbum, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, no. 8, which reads in part: "The tradition that comes from the apostles makes progress in the church, with the help of the holy Spirit. There is a growth in insight into the realities and the words that are being passed on. This comes about through the contemplation and study of believers who ponder these things in their hearts (see Lk. 2:19, and 51). It comes from the intimate sense of spiritual realities which they experience. And it comes from the preaching of those who, on succeeding to the office of bishop, have received the sure charism of truth. Thus, as the centuries go by, the church is always advancing towards the plenitude of divine truth, until the words of God are fulfilled in it." quently converged to create assumptions which justified intolerance and fostered an emotional climate from which only great spirits, truly free and filled with God, were in some way to break free (no. 35).
This beautiful and challenging passage indicates the complex work required to reach a judgment about the fault of the past, and hints at the many factors that may have led Christians of "good faith" to objective error. By linking specific faults to his judgment about the clarity of teaching provided by Vatican II, the Pope suggests these factors included the need for clarity in church teaching about the use of violence in the service of truth, or about the dignity of the human conscience. Indeed, in a brief discussion of Christian responsibility for the appeal of atheism, Gaudium et spes makes the connection of teaching and "good faith" explicit: "believers themselves often share some responsibility for this situation. . . . To the extent that they are careless about their instruction in the faith, or present its teaching falsely, or even fail in their religious, moral, or social life, they must be said to conceal rather than to reveal the true nature of God and of religion." 19 Further, when speaking about the blunders made by the Church's members, the pope and Dulles include previous popes, bishops, and other teachers within the Church. Whether there have been doctrinal errors that the Church should regret or even repent cannot be limited to whether popes or other Roman authorities taught error. Bishops too must be included, because, according to Lumen gentium no. 25: "Bishops who teach in communion with the Roman Pontiff are to be respected by all as witnesses of divine and catholic truth; the faithful, for their part, should concur with their bishop's judgment, made in the name of Christ, in matters of faith and morals, and adhere to it with a religious docility of spirit." 20 There are two points to be made here. First, among the things bishops and other ecclesiastical teachers do is teach. The distinction between action and teaching is faulty if it presupposes that teaching does not fall under a kind of action. Second, the matter cannot be resolved merely by looking at the papal record. What Rome said is of critical importance, perhaps especially when considering whether teaching is dogmatic, but it alone is not sufficient. The teaching of the entire Church informs the action of all its members.
Criticisms such as Cardinal Biffi's, then, may not so easily be rebuffed by Dulles's distinction between doctrinal and individual error. Cardinal Biffi's concern implies that Catholics (and non-Catholics) would have difficulty separating the mistakes of individuals from the Church's mistaken apprehension of the requirements of the gospel. The failures of the student very often do reflect failings of the teacher, either genuine or merely perceived. Certainly some of those whom Biffi refers to as "the young and simple faithful" may understand these admissions of error to impugn the teaching authority of the Church, 21 especially in a culture receptive to such charges. The question for the Church, then, is whether to build the process of confession, penance, and reconciliation on Dulles's distinction between doctrine and action, or to acknowledge that the perception of a relationship between individual failure and inadequate teaching on some scores is an insight the Church must face.
Purification of the Church's memory requires more than vague acknowledgment of sinfulness. It requires specificity about what sins were committed by whom. This leads directly to the historical aspect of the process of reconciliation. Genuine repentance roots itself in acknowledgement of specific guilt. Recognizing this, "Memory and Reconciliation," a document produced by the International Theological Commission, states:
Responsibility for what was said and done has to be precisely identified, taking into account the fact that the Church's request for forgiveness commits the single theological subject of the Church in the variety of ways and levels in which she is represented by individual persons and in the enormous diversity of historical and geographical situations. Generalization must be avoided. Any possible statement today must be situated in the contemporary context and undertaken by the appropriate subject (universal Church, bishops of a country, particular Churches, etc.).
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CATHOLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD SLAVERY
One candidate for repentance is the Church's role in Black slavery in the United States. Theologians and historians criticize the American Catholic bishops' failure to condemn slavery in the middle of the 19th century. There are different versions of just who is at fault for what all apparently agree was the failure of the American Catholic hierarchy to condemn slavery sufficiently. Joel Panzer accuses the American bishops of "explaining away" papal teaching. 23 Historian Cyprian Davis, O.S.B., offers one explanation for the bishops' failings: "The Roman Catholic bishops in the United States long avoided the issue of slavery. They practiced a form of denial and refused to concede that it was a moral issue. They were opposed to any effort to subvert the system." 24 Church-including Roman authorities-failed to condemn slavery sufficiently. 25 And John Noonan offers the most accusatory (yet still respectful) claim against the pope at that time: "Gregory XVI condemned the slave trade, but not so explicitly that the condemnation covered occasional sales by owners of surplus stock."
26 Noonan thus questions whether the condemnation of the slave trade was unambiguous. These authors condemn the Church's teaching on slavery, implicating Pope Gregory and the American hierarchy. And still others are implicated: Michael Baxter, C.S.C., chastised historian John Tracy Ellis for his failure to criticize the bishops. 27 These condemnations provide an excellent test case for investigating the relationship of church teaching to believers' behavior. The condemnations reveal as well the difficulties involved in making these kinds of judgments of our ancestors. Each expresses a different form of condemnation. Baxter believes slavery clearly and always violates the law of Christ. The bishops deserve Ellis's condemnation for their failure to see this. Ellis's failure to condemn them itself merits condemnation. Maxwell finds the entire Church culpable. The Church allowed and even favored slavery in certain contexts. The doctrine was just wrong. 28 Panzer's allegation presupposes a clear doctrine the bishops ignored: the bishops knew that the papal magisterium condemned slavery, but chose to ignore it. For Panzer, the American bishops are culpable precisely because they set aside the consistent teaching of the Church on the immorality of chattel slavery. Davis does not share that presupposition: his allegation acknowledges a possible doctrinal ambiguity; and yet he is highly critical of the bishops' behavior. These accusations provide an acid test for the kind of historical faults for which repentance is required. They all allege that, in the person of the U.S. bishops, the Church failed sufficiently to teach the immorality of slavery. In the cases of Panzer and Davis, the bishops deliberately led their flock away from sound church teaching. But Maxwell's allegation suggests the bishops merely followed what they took to be the Church's doctrine. They were being faithful to church teaching and transmitted it to their flock. theless, all the accusations agree that the Catholic population in the United States received erroneous teaching on the morality of slavery.
Let us allow the possibility-that error in church teaching may inform error in church practice-guide us through some historical reflections on slavery and U.S. Catholicism in the nineteenth century.
POPE GREGORY'S LETTER AND ITS RECEPTION
On December 3, 1839, Pope Gregory XVI promulgated his brief apostolic letter In supremo apostolatus, in which he condemned all involvement in the slave trade. 29 He wrote: "We warn and adjure earnestly in the Lord faithful Christians of every condition that no one in the future dare to vex anyone, despoil him of his possessions, reduce to servitude, or lend aid and favour to those who give themselves up to these practices, or exercise that inhuman traffic by which the Blacks, as if they were not men but rather animals . . ., are, without any distinction, in contempt of the rights of justice and humanity, bought, sold, and devoted sometimes to the hardest labour."
30 Gregory added that no ecclesiastic or layman should defend the "traffic in Blacks" in any manner and without fearing the gravest penalties. About a year after its promulgation, John Forsyth of Georgia, Martin Van Buren's secretary of state, used the letter to fan the embers of antiCatholicism. 31 He argued that British abolitionists, the papacy, and other sinister forces conspired to support the candidacy of William Henry Harrison, thus forcing Harrison upon the Southern Whig party to undermine Southern society. These same British abolitionists had pressured Pope Gregory into writing the anti-slavery letter In supremo. Forsyth hoped that Southern voters would associate papists and British abolitionists.
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The association was false and misrepresented Catholicism. Bishop John England of Charleston, South Carolina, composed 18 lengthy letters responding to Forsyth's accusation. 33 The first is dated September 29, 1840. On Forsyth's motives, England wonders: "Do I venture a rash opinion, when I say that your object was, to show a union of sentiment, if not a 29 There is no novelty, England argued, in a pope issuing a letter on slavery, nor in the contents of Pope Gregory's letter. The pope, Bishop England insisted, condemns the slave trade and makes no reference to "domestic slavery." 36 Forsyth's concern rests primarily on a misinterpretation of the document's meaning, attributable to his desire to smear Catholics and confuse the electorate.
England distinguishes the slave-trade, "the sale or purchase in the inhuman commerce by which negroes are sometimes devoted to intolerable labor," from domestic slavery. 37 American law already forbade the former, according to England. Pope Gregory's letter concurred with this judgment. Domestic slavery, of the type existing in the United States, was left "untouched" by the Pope's letter. 38 According to England, Pope Gregory's letter merely stated that domestic slavery was a permissible, if not commendable, social arrangement. England believed the American bishops unanimously interpreted the letter this way. As England says:
. . . if [the Pope's letter] condemned our domestic slavery as an unlawful and consequently immoral practice, the bishops could not have accepted it without being bound to refuse the sacraments to all who were slaveholders unless they manumitted their slaves; yet if you look to the prelates who accepted the document . . . you 34 The Works of the Right Reverend John England, First Bishop of Charleston, ed. Sebastian G. Messmer, 7 vols. (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clarke, 1908) vol. 5, 183-87. I cite by reference to the letter and the page number in Works. Thus, here, "Letter I," (184). I make no attempt to present England's analysis in its entirety. Though his letters merit such attention, I refer primarily to the first two. The other letters explain in great detail the theological, philosophical, and canonical sources for his interpretation of Pope Gregory's letter. Further, my article is not concerned with the accuracy of Bishop England's interpretation of Pope Gregory. 35 England, "Letter I," 185. Bishop England may have been wrong about this as the letter was written in response to a request made by the British government. 36 The subtitle of the English translation of the letter is "Apostolic Letter on the Slave Trade." Bishop England criticizes Forsyth's reference to " 'an apostolic letter on slavery.' " England, "Letter I," 187. In "Letter II," Bishop England refers to a conversation he and the pope had on the subject of Haiti. According to England, the pope stated: " 'Though the Southern States of your Union have had domestic slavery as an heirloom, whether they would or not, they are not engaged in the negro traffic,' that is, the 'slave trade' " (192) . 37 England, "Letter I," 188. 38 England, "Letter II," 191. Because domestic slavery was not inherently evil, slaveholding was not necessarily sinful. Slaveowners and slaves could behave in sinful ways, but their relationship did not necessarily constitute sin. Slaveowners thus could not be denied the sacraments. Many slaveholders were "pious" in "performing all their Christian duties," according to England. 40 England simultaneously stressed the sinfulness of the slave trade-the violent removal of persons from a state of freedom to a state of enslavement. 41 The responsibility of slaveowners and decent citizens, Bishop England wrote, was to criticize and reform slavery on the basis of this doctrine. The natural law amply governs the institution of slavery, not merely forbidding certain means by which persons become slaves. 42 England did not advance a "pro-slavery" argument as much as an "antiabolitionist" one. 43 As England stated: "I would never aid in establishing 39 Ibid. 190-91 40 Ibid. 41 In "Letter II," England defined the slave trade as "the compulsory slavery of an invaded people." The distinction between reducing free persons to slavery and defending the obligation of slaves to obey their masters is old, predating Christianity, but also stated in early Christian theology. See England regards as incomprehensible the view that In supremo could be understood as condemning domestic slavery. In his second letter to Forsyth he shows that domestic slavery has a variety of forms. If a specific case is proven false, then the general premise will be false as well. Beginning with what should be the easiest case, he discusses voluntary slavery. The abolitionists oppose voluntary slavery. Carelessly the abolitionists "assert, generally, that slavery is contrary to the natural law. The soundness of their position will be tried by inquiring into the lawfulness of holding in slavery a person, who has voluntarily sold himself." 46 England shows that Scripture and the natural law support voluntary self-enslavement. The theological tradition, England notes, follows Exodus 21:5 and Leviticus 25:47, according to which "man in his natural state is master of his own liberty, and may dispose of it as he sees proper." 47 As master of one's liberty, a person may preserve his or her life by sale into slavery. "Life and its preservation are more valuable than liberty." 48 England accepts the implicit presupposition that the natural law and Scripture cannot contradict each other. Scriptural evidence alone proves "the natural law then does not prohibit a man from bartering his liberty and his services to save his life" for all his life. 49 So the natural law does not prohibit slavery. But neither does it establish slavery. In a "state of pure nature all men are equal." 50 The "speculative philosophers" forget the consequences of the Fall. The "original transgression" explains the existence of slavery among men. The equality of all men does not preclude dominion among men, as long as the dominion is Smith founded on a just title. England dares his abolitionist opponents to refute Thomas Aquinas's distinction between changing and adding to the natural law. 51 God permitted humans to add to natural law those things necessary for human society but not explicitly prohibited by His law. Slavery and other forms of dominion over property did not contravene the law. Therefore, though man did not necessarily have to embrace slavery or private property, he could. Principled opposition to slavery was therefore no more justifiable than principled opposition to accumulation of wealth. Thus England: "As well may the wealthy merchant then assert, that it is against the law of nature that one man should possess a larger share of the common fund belonging to the human family for his exclusive benefit, as that it is against the law of nature for one man to be the slave of another." 52 England's evaluation of Pope Gregory's letter represented the dominant ecclesial position in America. 53 Prominent Catholics North and South adopted his argument in pieces and in full to defend the Church against accusations from all sides. 54 It not only held the day. Historians of the period agree that England offered the standard interpretation. So, historian Patrick Carey: "Many Catholics not only accepted the American institution of slavery, they also found support for it in Catholic teaching, justifying it on biblical, historical, and theological grounds. In the 1840s . . . 54 Theologian Francis Patrick Kenrick's Theologia moralis (Philadelphia, 1841) agreed that slavery is not malum in se. Like England in "Letter III," Kenrick argued slavery was licit if based on just titles of enslavement, such as capture in war, natality (being born into slavery), punishment for crime, and self-sale or sale of one's children. May Catholics hold slaves? Kenrick asked. "The answer seems to be in the affirmative, for the defect of the title must be considered as healed by the lapse of a very long time, since the condition of society otherwise would always be uncertain. Indeed they sin who by force take unwilling men as slaves, but it does not seem unjust to hold the descendants of these slaves in slavery, namely, a condition in which they were born and which they are not able to leave." Quoted in Hugh J. generally accepted England's argument."
55 Robert Joseph Murphy, who composed a detailed study of the Church during the Civil War agrees. "The fact that these letters to Forsyth met with no protest from Dr. England's fellow prelates is an evidence that this was the sense in which they all understood the papal document and the Catholic teaching." 56 The official interpretation, judged by numbers of adherents as well as by influence, was England's.
The Catholic hierarchy in America did not consider slavery an urgent moral issue. Historian Cyprian Davis explains that slavery was "the issue that dominated the national scene because it permeated all other questions." Yet, the American Catholic bishops did not pursue the slavery problem.
57 Bishop England's interpretation of Pope Gregory's letter permitted the bishops to continue to hold that slavery was not sinful in se.
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The late historian James Hennesey, S. J., wrote: "Opponents of slavery found slight support in official church teaching. Pope Gregory XVI in 1839 condemned the slave trade, but not slavery itself." 59 The doctrine left individual Catholics free to determine the prudent response to slavery and abolitionism.
In fact, "Catholics North and South opposed the abolition movement." 58 See also Capizzi, "A Development of Doctrine" 238; Hennesey, American Catholics; Carey, The Roman Catholics 45; Cyprian Davis, The History of Black Catholics in the United States 65; and Curran, "Rome, the American Church, and Slavery" 33. 59 Hennesey, American Catholics 145. 60 Curran, "Rome, the American Church, and Slavery" 40. Many, though not all, abolitionists were openly anti-Catholic, as well. priate way to end slavery was gradual emancipation, not abolitionism. 61 The bishops believed the gospel gradually transformed culture. Christ, England wrote, "enforced principles that, by their necessary operation and gradual influence, produced an extensive amelioration." The ameliorative view predominated, as Bergier's Dictionnaire théologique article, "Esclavage" shows. Bergier, quoted by England, stated: " 'The divine legislator . . . disposed the minds of people by his maxims of charity, of meekness, of fraternal love between men, to perceive that slavery . . . was getting into opposition to the natural law.' " 62 The abolitionists, England threatened, had no friends in Southern Catholics or Protestants. "I know no Carolinian," he wrote, "who more sincerely deplores, more fully condemns, or more seriously reprobates the conduct of those men, who, by pouring [abolitionists] in upon us, are destroying our peace, and endangering our safety." The abolitionist position was unchristian. The Christian position, articulated and defended by England, contends that "domestic" slavery is permissible as a social order in consequence of sin.
This theological view informed the Catholic ecclesial response to the political problem. The bishops were unwilling to take sides in what their doctrine led them to perceive as a political, and not a religious or a moral, dispute. 63 In the nine bishops' councils held between 1829-1849, the issue of slavery went virtually unnoticed. Though read, Pope Gregory's letter was not discussed at the 1840 Council. 64 Even with great American expec-tation that the bishops would have something to say about slavery at their First Plenary Council, held in 1852, they said nothing. As always they exhorted the faithful to obedience to civil institutions. The bishops' gradualist preferences were evident even after the Civil War. In their pastoral letter closing the Second Plenary Council (1866), they wrote:
We must all feel, beloved Brethren, that in some manner a near and most extensive field of charity and devotedness has been opened to us, by the emancipation of the immense slave population of the South. We could have wished, that in accordance with the action of the Catholic Church in past ages . . . a more gradual system of emancipation could have been adopted, so that they might have been in some measure more prepared to make better use of their freedom. . . ."
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FOUR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
Four factors provide a partial explanation for the bishops' interpretation of the doctrine on slavery. First, the bishops' view of slavery as not inherently sinful depends in part on their theological commitments, including their understanding of the immutability of Catholic doctrine. At the session prior to the one at which Pope Gregory's letter on slavery was read, Bishop England preached "on the unchanged and unchangeable doctrine of the Church." political and not strictly a moral question, the bishops embraced nonpartisanship. In part, again, the doctrine supported the view that slavery was a political question. Because slavery was not in se contrary to the natural law, specific determinations were subject to the political process. 68 The volatile social climate buttressed this doctrinal view that Catholics should stay out of the slavery question. According to historian Peter Guilday, the "foremost political problem of the day had become too complex and was being too bitterly discussed to permit any hope that the moral distinction between slavery and the slave trade (as made clear by Gregory XVI in his letter of 1839 and by Dr. England's Letters to Forsyth) could be made." 69 The bishops could, and did, continue to advise the conduct of individual slaveowners. Their 1852 letter does contain a subtle response to the country's troubles. In the section on civil allegiance the bishops write: "Attachment to the civil institutions under which you live, has always marked our conduct: and if we address you on this subject, it is not from any apprehension that you are likely to vary from the conduct which you have hitherto pursued." 70 The bishops obviously identified pressure on the laity to depart from past "conduct." That pressure, "the idle babbling of foolish men," the bishops call it, included abolitionists.
The minority status of Catholicism contributed to a reluctance to enter political debate. The hostility of Protestant America, associated with notorious questions about Catholic dual allegiance to Pope and state and suspicions about the motives of immigration from southern Europe, are well known. Catholics repeatedly had to prove their loyalty to the state. The war with Catholic Mexico (1846-1848), for example, provided another opportunity for anti-Catholic sentiment to attach to concerns about popery and Catholic loyalty. Out of considerations for the Catholic place in society convert Orestes Brownson refused to speak about that war until 1847, at 68 The bishops' acceptance of a rigid separation between politics and religion resonated widely. On January 1, 1861, the New York Herald attributed "the gigantic portion" of the impending war to "the fact that the social institution of slavery has been made into a moral and religious question, and in that shape has entered deeply into the politics" of the United States. It continued, ominously, "when the institution of African slavery becomes-as it has become within the last quarter of a century-to be regarded as a great moral wrong-an iniquity crying to Heaven for vengeance-the question assumes at once the form and features of religious agitation . . . animating the same persecuting spirit as the religious warfare that dominated Europe for three centuries. which point he condemned it as "uncalled for, impolitic, and unjust." Speaking any earlier, he wrote, would have been out of line. Denunciation of a war presently engaged in would have been a violation of the virtue of loyalty. 71 The Catholic reluctance publicly to address social affairs affected the response to slavery. To some extent, this was a rationalization, as the bishops chose to speak on issues closer to their constituency (especially anti-Catholicism) or of keener personal interest (such as Bishop John Hughes's activity in New York politics). Nonetheless, the Catholic hierarchy appeared indifferent to slavery. Protestant churches had been dividing along denominational and territorial lines between 1844 and 1852. Many Catholics were of the explicit view that the dilemma of slavery was not an ecclesial problem; each state should resolve it independently of hierarchical Catholic input. There was much public praise at the time for the bishops' nonpartisanship. The Dispatch of Richmond, Virginia, paid tribute to "the Catholic Church throughout the United States for the entire abstinence of its clergy from all intermeddling, either one way or the other, with the national troubles. . . ." 72 "Our clergy literally know no North, no South, no East, no West;" wrote the Louisville Guardian, "they are the same everywhere; and they attend everywhere to religion, and let the politicians take care of themselves." 73 Brownson, in a statement of staggering audacity, commends the Catholic Church for its moderation: "Only the church, which can be surprised by no new moral or social question, which has nothing to learn from experience, and whose doctrines on all subjects are long ago determined and fixed, remains unaffected by the fanaticism around her, and pays no attention to the decisions of modern casuists." 74 Historians commend the Catholic hierarchy for its nonpartisanship. Guilday, for instance, writes of the bishops' "wisdom." 75 Third, even though by this time slavery had been abolished in much of Western Europe slavery in the United States appeared intractable and abolition imprudent. Many Catholics often commented that church doc-trine did not require them to favor slavery, merely to acknowledge its "right" as a human institution. Generally, the Catholic hierarchy opposed the fanaticism, the anti-biblicism, and anti-Catholicism of abolitionism. 76 Also, they viewed abolitionism as imprudent. This view found support on both sides of the equation. On one side, White America was unprepared for freed slaves. Abolition, it was argued, would doom the American economy; the South would collapse without the free labor system. Militant abolitionists were assailed as well for their careless disrespect for Constitutional process. The consequences of social upheaval would far outweigh the benefits of emancipation.
Abolitionist theologians, according to those of this view, blurred the line between political and moral issues and thus perverted Scripture when they equated political issues with moral problems. William Sumner Jenkins explains that Southerners justified slavery as a political evil, appealing to the traditional excuses of "social and economic necessity." 77 As a mere political evil, normal legislative processes needed space and time to resolve the matter. Allow each state to determine if the time was right, if the exigencies permitted, the end of slavery. Certain political evils were to be accepted; they lay beyond the sphere of the moral life to which the gospel directed itself. Moral evils were unacceptable. Men and women were responsible for their moral failings. Societal failings on the other hand were common.
On the other side, many believed the slaves ill-equipped for liberty. This conviction often entailed commitment to racial inferiority. Racist fear was a powerful antidote to anti-slavery. Even though most White Southerners did not own slaves, they continued to support slavery because of racist conceptions about Black inferiority. 78 But the idea that manumitted slaves would be a social nuisance is old. tion, especially in the South. Many Catholic theologians were content to take things as presented to them. Theologian Kenrick wrote: "As regards political institutions, [the Catholic Church] is wholly independent of any, and suited to all. It is not her province to model or fashion them; but being indifferent to each particular form of social organization, she studies only to infuse the spirit and maxims of Christ, and thus to modify and mitigate whatever may be exorbitant and unjust." 80 Catholics were encouraged to and did divide along sectional lines. Randall M. Miller writes, "In short, the church tolerated disunity in political matters so that it could concentrate on achieving ethnic unity in religious ones." 81 Even in this condensed version of the history, it is possible to note that in their deference to the political nature of slavery the bishops followed what they believed to be church teaching. One could be a slaveowner and a good Christian, as long as one followed the moral exhortations contained in the doctrine. Yes, slavery was acceptable, but the doctrine emphasized the relationship between master and slave entailed a relationship of mutual duties.
MODERN ASSESSMENT
Today, however, the issue is framed so differently that the bishops' judgment is suspect. 82 The bishops lived with slavery as an apparently intractable social condition, or one whose extraction could only come at great social cost. They did not advocate slavery as much as oppose abolitionism. This they judged the prudent response. 82 A further and necessary project would involve specifying the grounds of the contemporary objection. I think today we judge as essential to slavery certain dehumanizing aspects they thought accidental. That is, the kind of power that masters held over slaves is itself a violation of their dignity, irrespective of the benevolence with which a particular master may treat his slave. As many abolitionists knew, a judgment that slavery is inherently evil cannot rest comfortably on scriptural grounds. Neither can the judgment rest easily on natural rights theories, as Alasdair Macintyre suggested (see his "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Charles Yet, even if we accept the bishops' view of the teaching, we have grounds to question their action. While they could not condemn slavery in se as a violation of Christ's law, their understanding of the doctrine should have led them to greater criticism of the practice of slavery in the United States. This may console few of us, but the substantive point is significant. England, Kenrick, and others said church doctrine did not permit the absolute condemnation of slavery, supported the case for gradual abolition, and created space for discussion on the political solutions appropriate to slavery. But, to what extent did they participate in any of this? Bishop England's interpretation of Pope Gregory's letter contains very little of use to gradualists. Indeed, historian Joseph Kelley shows how England's efforts to distance the Church from abolitionism hobbled his capacity to voice a criticism of slavery and injustice toward Blacks to which gradualists could appeal. Thus Kelley's harsh judgment of Bishop England as a "good man who failed to be great." 83 Likewise, Kenrick's Theologia moralis is an unqualified pro-slavery argument. 84 The state of the doctrine compelled them to scrutinize the laws and practices of slavery more closely than they did. At one point, for instance, Bishop England acknowledged that Southern slavery cannot be compared to voluntary slavery, yet he dropped the matter before drawing any conclusions. John Hughes, Archbishop of New York, vigorously opposed abolitionism and non-abolitionist attempts to deal with slavery. 85 Constructively, he offered only "prayers, gave promises, and urged good will." These efforts prompted one writer to ask: "With such an alternative, one may question the meaning of the Archbishop's claim that he was no friend of slavery." 86 Did the doctrine that the bishops drew upon leave it at that? Doctrinal "indifference" to the political question should not have led to indifference to the state of American slavery and the physical and spiritual condition of American slaves. 87 The doctrine drew on a long history of treating the slave as a human person. 88 In areas colonized by the Spanish and Portuguese Roman and Catholic law recognized rights of the slave attending to him qua man. According to Frank Tannenbaum, in these areas "the slave had 83 a body of law, protective of him as a human being, which was already there when the Negro arrived and had been elaborated long before he came upon the scene." 89 Catholic countries had a long history with slavery and a ready body of law articulating duties and responsibilities of masters to slaves. Bishop England, whose extensive knowledge of the tradition is so evident in his letters defending the distinction between domestic slavery and the slave trade, certainly was aware of these duties. The first duty, of course, the oft stated justification for colonization of the Western Hemisphere, was evangelization. In this regard there is evidence that Catholics failed. Emmett Curran has written a compelling essay on Jesuit slaveholding that shows the material and spiritual neglect of slaves in Jesuit care. The slaves were spiritually barren, illiterate and uneducated in the faith. 90 This is not, of course, a sufficient description of the relationship between Catholicism and slavery in the United States. Further historical work of the type begun by Cyprian Davis and Emmett Curran is necessary to judge the bishops by these-their own-standards.
This historical work is also necessary for us as we proceed in the purification of the Church's memory called for by John Paul II. That historical work will show that repentance may be necessary for erroneous teaching that misled Catholics of good will in difficult circumstances. In our age of constant individual and social introspection, the Church subjects its memory to public evaluation and scrutiny. The public nature of this process is necessary today, but it is the source of anxieties. 91 The fear is that public scrutiny tends to be uncontrollable; the effort to evaluate memory subject to forces alien and even hostile to the Church. This is most clearly the case in an age suspicious of all institutions of authority. The criticisms of institutions and their histories too often serve to defend the moral superiority of the present against the past.
One of the lessons of the foregoing historical study should also lead us to explore the ways our doctrinal commitments compel us into certain patterns of behavior. We saw how the doctrine supported the bishops' view that slavery was not sinful in se. We saw, too, evidence that the doctrine led them to defend a slave system that failed by their own standards. Yet, because of doctrinal and cultural commitments, the latter failure went almost unnoticed. In striving to make a theoretical point (distinguishing domestic slavery from the slave trade) the bishops backed themselves into an unnecessary complacency with a corrupt institution. Even if we allow that domestic slavery could be distinguished from the slave trade, we still must wonder in what ways, if at all, the slavery in the South met the standards of Christian domestic slavery that Catholic theologians described?
And yet that is not the entire story. Although the doctrine, as I have tried to show, contributed to the failure of the bishops to see slavery's full moral offensiveness, the doctrine takes away just as it gives. The traditional doctrine as stated and defended by England and other American Catholics condemns them for their failure to scrutinize slavery by its standards. The practice of slavery in the United States was immoral, occurring with little regard to the welfare of individual slaves or their families. By their own standard, the bishops missed an opportunity to show the American public the genius of their nonetheless flawed doctrine.
